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Introduction
Smoking has been declared a deadly disease. According to a report with the telling title Tobacco or Health in the European Union, financed by and prepared for the European Commission (2004), 1 smoking is the single largest cause of avoidable death in the European Union (EU), killing 625.000 smokers each year (one in seven of all deaths) and involving gross costs estimated at between 1.04 and 1.39% of the EU's GDP in 2000. As the backbone of a strong 'smoking intervention policy', the report recommends that '[r]egular increases in tobacco taxes should be an implicit part of government efforts at EU and Member State level as these underpin other tobacco-control measures.' 2 Next to the level, the structure of tobacco taxation is considered important. Should tobacco excises be levied at a fixed amount per quantity (specific rate), a fixed percentage of the product's retail price (ad valorem rate), or some combination of these rates? Indeed, thus far, the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation has governed much of the debate on the harmonization of tobacco excises in the EU. Although the EU's directives still have detailed rules regarding this balance, the 2004 report believes that '[d] ifferences in tax rates should be harmonised on the basis of specific rates as opposed to ad valorem.'
In 2006, the European Commission will have to submit its next four-year report on tobacco taxation to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 3 In anticipation of this report, this article reviews and evaluates current tobacco tax regimes in the EU. Section 2 lists the main elements of the agreed excise duty structure, called acquis communautaire, and highlights the diversity of cigarette tax rates and structures across the EU. Since the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation is a bone of contention, section 3 summarizes the theoretical findings on this issue. Subsequently, section 4 reviews the evidence on the question of whether smokers pay for the costs they impose on others. Next, section 5 dwells on revenue and tax rate issues, while section 6 deals with bootlegging and smuggling. Section 7 summarizes the main tax policy points that emerge from the analysis. 
Excise Duty Structures
The current tobacco tax structures in the EU have evolved over 35 years in a series of political compromises and exigencies, with reforms often triggered by the prospective accession of new Member States. The latest Council directive (Council of the European Union, 2002) prescribes the following agreed tax measures:
• Member States impose a cigarette excise duty consisting of a specific and an ad valorem component. Effective July 1, 2006, the minimum total excise duty must be €64 per thousand cigarettes (€1.28 per pack of twenty). This requirement applies to all cigarettes.
• Furthermore, the minimum total level of excise taxation on the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) of cigarettes in each Member State should be 57% of the tax-inclusive (excise plus VAT) retail sale price. 4 States are exempt from this requirement if the total excise duty on MPPC cigarettes is €101 or more per thousand cigarettes (€2.02 per pack of twenty).
• Member States can choose to set a minimum level of excise duty on all cigarettes at 100% of the level of the excises on the MPPC.
• There must be an element of both specific and ad valorem tax in the cigarette excise duty charged by Member States, with the specific element no less than 5% and no more than 55% of the total tax on the MPPC, including the VAT (which is identical in effect to the ad valorem excise duty).
• Sharply reduced rates -measured in terms of the price or weight of tobacco -apply to (a) fine-cut or rolling tobacco: 36% of the tax-inclusive retail price or €32 per kg; (b) cigars and cigarillos: 5% of the tax-inclusive retail price or €11 per 1000 items or per kg; and (c) other smoking tobacco: 20% of the tax-inclusive retail price or €20 per kg. There is no prescribed specific component for these tobacco products.
• All tobacco products are subject to the standard VAT rate, which should not be less than 15%.
• Intra-EU cross-border duty-paid shopping allowances are the followingcigarettes: 40 packs; cigars: 200 items; cigarillos: 400 items; and smoking tobacco: 1kg.
• In addition to these tax measures, the European Commission has issued rules regarding health warnings on tobacco packages, as well as restrictions on advertisements, sponsorships, and smoking in public places.
The discussion in this article focuses mainly on cigarettes, which account for nearly 90% of total tobacco product sales. Figure 1 shows that the acquis communautaire for cigarettes permits a wide range of total tax levels (specific and ad valorem excises plus VAT) and excise duty structures (specific vs. ad valorem taxes), as well as retail selling prices, throughout the EU. In the 'old' Member States (EU-15; see Table 1 ), total taxes on MPPC cigarettes, at, on average, in excess of 300% of the pre-tax retail price, are the highest on any single product in the world; by comparison, the standard VAT rate is, on average, 19.8% in these states. Furthermore, while relative total tax burdens of, on average, 75% of the retail price do not vary greatly between most Member States, there are substantial differences in the absolute amounts of total tax burdens and retail prices of MPPC cigarettes. The UK, for example, levies €5.88 tax per pack of 20 cigarettes (of which €3.01 is from the specific rate), but Spain only €1.76 (of which €0.16 is from the specific rate). Not surprisingly, retail prices are €7.43 and €2.25 per pack, respectively -a difference of €5.18 per pack or €0.26 per stick. Clearly, harmonization still has some way to go.
Figure 1 Taxes on Cigarettes in the European Union
All old EU Member States meet the minimum total excise requirement of €64 per thousand cigarettes. In Denmark and Sweden, the total excise duty is less than 57% of the retail selling price, but then the overall excise burden in these countries is more than €101, which supersedes the 57% requirement. Of the 'new' Member States (EU-10; see Table1), Cyprus and Malta comply with the acquis communautaire and Hungary with the 57% criterion, but the other new states do not; they will have to increase current excise duty levels on cigarettes by between 18% (Slovenia) and 310% (Latvia) to do so.
The preference for a predominantly specific or ad valorem duty is about evenly divided among Member States. When both rates are expressed as percentages of the VAT-exclusive retail price, 12 mainly northern tobacco-importing Member States have a predominantly specific excise duty structure while 13 mainly southern tobacco-growing Member States have a preference for the ad valorem excise duty. Notable exceptions to the north-south contrast are Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden, where the ad valorem rate is higher than the specific rate, and Portugal, where the specific rate dominates the ad valorem rate.
Specific vs. Ad Valorem Rates
What is the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation? 5 In practice, the balance is not dictated by theoretical considerations about product quality, external costs, or revenue, but mainly by protectionist sentiments. The home-grown tobaccos of the southern Member States are cheaper than the higher-quality American blends that the northern Member States import for their consumers, as reflected in the differences in retail prices minus taxes (in other words, production and distribution costs) in Figure 1 : the pre-tax price ranges from €0.22 (Latvia) to €1.55 (UK) per pack, and from 20% (France) to 39% (Lithuania) of the retail price. Since a specific rate tends to shrink relative price differences between low-cost and high-cost brands, whereas an ad valorem regime does not, the latter is more propitious to southern European producers, mainly Italy and Greece. 6 Since the European Commission has expressed an interest in giving more weight to the specific rate, it may be instructive to review briefly the theoretical arguments regarding the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation. 7 In a perfectly competitive market for a homogeneous good, the choice is irrelevant: any specific tax could be replaced by its percentage equivalent with no effect on consumer and producer prices or on government revenue.
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In an imperfectly competitive market, however, quality levels between similar excisable products, such as cigarettes, differ widely: someone who smokes knows that there are large differences in quality between a Virginia and two sticks of sawdust. In such a market, a common specific tax rate reduces relative price differences between low-quality and high-quality brands, while a common ad valorem rate does not. Standard optimal tax considerations would therefore seem to argue for ad valorem taxation -relative prices would be unchanged, and consumers would continue to choose brand on the basis of cost rather than tax differences. 8 These arguments apply to competitive markets in which the set of quality levels on offer is given exogenously. With imperfect competition, however, firms' incentives to raise price and to distort quality may be quite different under specific and ad valorem taxation. In the case of a monopolist, for example, specific taxation increases marginal costs by a fixed amount, whereas ad valorem taxation acts as a proportional tax on costs, together with a proportional (lump-sum) tax on monopoly profits. By taxing marginal revenue, ad valorem taxation, t a , increases the firm's perceived demand elasticity by the multiplier 1/(1-t a ) and so diminishes incentives for the firm to raise price above marginal cost. Thus one might expect consumer prices to be lower under ad valorem than under specific taxation. Indeed, it is possible to show, in the monopoly case, that replacing a specific tax, t s , by its ad valorem equivalent, t a =t s /p, causes consumer prices to fall and tax revenue and monopoly profits to rise (Skeath and Trandel, 1994) . So everyone gains from ad valorem taxationexcept the public health advocate.
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Just as ad valorem taxation seems to induce firms to cut prices, it also creates a clear incentive to downgrade product quality (Barzel, 1976) , because the multiplier effect of ad valorem taxation makes improvements in product quality more expensive for the firm. The cost of carbon filters, for example, which purify the tobacco of tar and other harmful substances, is subject to the multiplier effect. Likewise, ad valorem taxation reduces incentives to invest in advertising, promotion, and other demand-enhancing fixed costs of production.
8 Of course, the tax would still have income effects that might induce consumers to choose lower-quality brands, but so would a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. The theory of optimal taxation implies that a uniform percentage tax on a subset of commodities is desirable only under restrictive conditions on preferences (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) , but in this context those restrictions seem plausible. 9 In the Cournot model of an oligopoly industry, the story is largely the same: a shift to ad valorem taxation will reduce prices and increase government revenues. In this case, however, industry profits may fall, as competition among firms intensifies.
A further, testable, implication of the theory is that the pass-through of tax increases to consumer prices should be greater under specific than under ad valorem taxation (Delipalla and Keen, 1992) . Indeed, there is some evidence that specific taxes in the EU are more likely to be 'over-shifted' (consumer prices rise by more than the tax) than ad valorem taxes (Delipalla and O'Donnell, 2001 ).
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In contrast, specific taxation does not directly distort manufacturers' decisions to invest in product quality.
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In short, the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation depends on whether the primary aim of the policy is to discourage consumption or to raise revenue and on whether improvements in product quality are deemed desirable or not. Furthermore, if the goal of policy is to reduce consumption, there is some tension between the tendency of specific taxes to lead to higher consumer prices and the tendency of ad valorem taxes to discourage investments in quality that keep consumers 'hooked'. (On the other hand, if the goal is to reduce consumption damage, ad valorem rates have the drawback that they discourage expensive filters.) On balance, the solution is likely to be ad valorem taxation at a higher equivalent rate to achieve the desired level of consumer prices, and with concomitant gains for government treasuries.
The Pigouvian perspective leads to a very different conclusion, however -the damage caused by smoking is, at any point in time, independent of the price at which cigarettes are sold, so that correction of externalities favors specific over ad valorem taxation.
11 Furthermore, other, more immediate, considerations might govern the choice of tax structure. Thus, a specific tax can be imposed at the manufacturer's or importer's stage where it is easiest to collect, whereas, under a system of free trade prices, an ad valorem levy must be collected at the retail stage if trade distortions and tax avoidance are to be avoided. In the EU, of course, most Member States circumvent this issue by determining the ad valorem excise by reference to agreed retail prices, making the excise a specific tax as long as cigarette producers do not negotiate new retail prices with the excise tax authorities. In recent years, the controversy about specific vs. ad valorem taxation has largely been overtaken by a heated debate about the costs that smokers impose on society. Smoking is a primary cause of lung cancer, emphysema, and chronic bronchitis, and a major cause of heart disease and stroke. The economic costs -related primarily to the expense of treating smoking-related illnesses, as well as the well-being and market earnings that are lost as a consequence of 10 However, specific taxation may induce consumers to opt for higher-quality brands, if the degree of tax shifting is independent of product quality. In support of this view, Sobel and Garrett (1997) find that specific tax increases in US states are associated with significant declines in the market share of generic brands.
11 An economic counter-argument is that the share of specific in total taxation should be smaller when the marginal cost of public funds is higher and the importance of excise duties for generating revenue correspondingly greater. To some extent, this reasoning is consistent with the ad valorem excise element in EU tobacco tax structures.
smoking-related illnesses and death -are relevant to public policy if external, i.e. imposed on others, rather than internal, i.e. borne privately by the smoker (e.g. through higher health insurance contributions). 13 Along with information failures, i.e. lack of knowledge about addiction and health risks, the external costs establish a case for government intervention through taxation, as well as, or instead of, through regulation and education.
Various researchers have attempted to provide empirical estimates of the gross (public and private) external costs of smoking. The essence of the most common approach is to use healthcare utilization rates to forecast the incremental health expenditures for the current generation of smokers, make some additions for the healthcare costs associated with environmental or 'second-hand' tobacco smoke, 14 and then divide the total amount by the number of packs of cigarettes currently consumed, to arrive at an estimate of the (average) Pigouvian tax rate. Since the externalities from tobacco consumption may well be almost constant across each unit consumed, the average tax rate should closely approximate the marginal tax rate.
On the basis of a careful review of a large number of studies, Lightwood et al. (2000) conclude that estimates of gross external costs range from 0.1 to 1.1% of GDP in high-income countries. The higher estimates are found in countries where healthcare costs account for a relatively large share of GDP. As regards EU Member States, research in the UK for 1985-86 estimated gross costs at between 0.08 and 0.13% of GDP (Maynard et al., 1987) , while gross costs in Finland for 1995 were estimated at 0.17% of GDP (Pekurinen, 1999) .
Smokers tend to live shorter lives than non-smokers, however, which saves on pension payments and healthcare costs of age-related diseases. 15 From an economic point of view, therefore, it is net costs, which assess all government social security expenditures over a lifetime, that should be the focus of analysis. 16 Although Lightwood et al. (2000) conclude that the majority of the 13 The distinction between public and private healthcare expenditures seems irrelevant if private health insurers do not successfully control moral hazard by smoking clients. In this case, virtually all smoking-related healthcare expenditures are properly classified as external costs that should be internalized through Pigouvian taxation.
14 Viscusi (2002) indicates that the evidence on the potential health risks of second-hand smoke is not as compelling as the evidence on risks of primary tobacco smoke, which are among the most well-established health risks. It is also argued that much second-hand smoke is experienced within the family home. Accordingly, such costs should be internalized by the smoker, either through altruism or through explicit negotiations among family members (Manning et al., 1989) . This is not entirely plausible, however, if the family members are very young or still unborn. 15 Obviously, this does not mean that death is an economically desirable event. Rather, as Warner et al. (1995) point out, it simply means that as long as early death reduces the extra social costs in the form of social benefits and pensions, smokers should receive a 'credit' for the associated savings. 16 It is sometimes argued that the output, income, and employment generated by the tobacco industry must be viewed as benefits to the community at large, but this proposition rests on the highly unlikely assumptions that, in the absence of smoking, the money spent on cigarettes would not be spent on other products and that the resources used in producing cigarettes would have no alternative uses. This having been said, short-run adjustment costs from industry downsizing would arise, of course.
cross-section studies reviewed by them indicate that the net costs of smoking are small but positive, there are notable exceptions in the literature. For the Netherlands, for instance, Barendregt et al. (1997) calculated the length of time it takes for the cost savings from smoking to be balanced by the increased costs from the longer life expectancies of non-smokers. Their results imply that smoking reduces net healthcare costs (using a discount rate of up to 5%). Similarly, a study for Finland (Pekurinen, 1992) concluded that smoking could involve net healthcare cost savings (using a 4% discount rate).
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This evidence is striking, because it means that government measures to reduce smoking through higher taxes would seem to be a form of paternalism on which economics has little to say. After all, the principle of consumer sovereignty implies that a rational person who weighs up all the costs and benefits of his actions should be free to smoke as long as he is fully informed about the consequences of his choice and does not impose costs on others. Admittedly, as has been pointed out, the rationality condition ceases to apply if smokers are illinformed about the consequences of smoking, act myopically in choosing to consume an addictive drug (Peck et al., 2000) , or behave in a dynamically inconsistent fashion (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001 ) by discounting costs and benefits in the near-term future to a greater extent than those in the long term.
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In the main, however, the rationality hypothesis is the cornerstone of economic analysis. Accordingly, on economic grounds, the role of taxation in curtailing tobacco use at current levels of excise duties and VATs does not seem very strong in the EU, because smokers seem to pay their way and probably more than that. This economic conclusion, of course, may not satisfy public health advocates who believe that less smoking is always better. But this position rests on the questionable assumption that governments know what is best for people.
On balance, the line should probably be drawn at providing information on the consequences of smoking, banning smoking in public places, and discouraging smoking by the young.
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Revenue and Tax Rate Issues
Taxation of cigarettes (and other tobacco products) generates widely varying amounts of tax revenue in different Member States, largely (although not entirely) attributable to differences in the level of taxation. Table 1 indicates that tobacco taxes range from €24 per capita in Lithuania to €333 in Ireland and €1353 in Luxembourg, which snatches a considerable part of the tax base of its neighboring Member States (see below). These figures include the VAT, which is imposed on the excises as well as on the cost of tobacco products. 20 On average, the old Member States collect considerably more on a per-capita basis than the new Member States, with the exception of the small island economies, Malta and Cyprus, and Slovenia. Obviously, per-capita tax revenue is also correlated with per-capita consumption. As the table shows, a greater percentage of men than women smoke, except in emancipated Sweden, and on average the percentage of male smokers is higher in new Member States than in old states.
A standard economic justification for the imposition of high tobacco taxes is that they minimize the efficiency costs of raising a given amount of revenue, because the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is low. What evidence is there that this 'inverse elasticity' rule indicates above-average taxes on tobacco? Viscusi (1992 Viscusi ( , 2002 ) provides a review of 41 studies on the effect of cigarette prices on the demand for cigarettes. Thirty-one of these studies are for the US, for which the estimated elasticities of demand are clustered in the range-0.4 to -1.0. Nine of the studies are for the UK, where the estimated elasticity range is from -0.1 to -0.8, but most studies yield estimates around -0.5 or -0.6. As expected, the long-run elasticity is higher than the short-run elasticity and young people are more price-responsive than older smokers. Viscusi (2006) points out that the tobacco price elasticity is not unlike similar estimates for stationery, legal services, automobile repairs, and newspapers and magazines, as well as a wide variety of food products, ranging from chickens to bananas. On balance, therefore, the price elasticity of tobacco demand is not so low that significantly higher-than-average tax rates are warranted on inverse elasticity grounds.
As regards the structure of the excise duties across different tobacco products, there is considerable substitution away from high-taxed cigarettes towards lowtaxed roll-your-own (fine-cut) tobacco. Over the period 2002-04, the weighted average quantity of cigarettes released for consumption decreased by 10%, while the quantity of roll-your-own tobacco (which accounts for some one-tenth of tobacco product sales) increased by 20%. 21 Cigarettes contain some 0.75 grams of tobacco. Allowing for cost differences, presumably roll-your-own tobacco should be taxed at two-thirds of the €64/1000 sticks excise duty level on cigarettes or at €57 per kg, three-fourths higher than the current agreed minimum rate of €32 per kg.
Another issue concerns the prescribed calculation of the tax burden by reference to the MPPC concept. This concept, necessitated by the use of high ad valorem excise duties on cigarettes, appears ill-defined and subject to manipulation (Oxford Economic Forecasting, 2004) . Administrative problems and uncertainty arise, because the MPPC can be taken from any time period in the two years prior to the date that the tax is calculated, while the MPPC category can represent as little as 14% of total market volume. When the market leader in any Member State raises its MPPC price, this may force tax and price increases of competitive brands -an abuse of dominant position, arguably in violation of Article 82 of the EU Treaty.
Similarly, the 57% criterion has perverse effects below the €101 level. A Member State with a volatile cigarette market where the MPPC changes from the top of the price range to the bottom can be conforming to the minimum excise one day and be in breach of the acquis communautaire the next, without having made any change to its tax rates and with virtually no change in the market situation. Adoption of a single specific rate eventually would obviate the need for the anachronistic MPPC concept and the 57% criterion.
Finally, it should be noted that tobacco taxes are highly discriminatory and regressive, more so than any other tax. In the EU, only 36% of men and 22% of women pay tobacco taxes (see Table 1 ). Regressivity should not be an issue if tobacco taxes serve as a proxy for social costs that should be reflected in the price of cigarettes: the poor, just like the rich, should pay for the costs they impose on others. But if the social cost argument does not cut much ice (see above), then regressivity is an issue that should be taken into consideration. Proportionately, the poor spend a higher share of their income on cigarettes than the rich, assuming that the prevalence of smoking is the same. As a group, however, the poor smoke more than the rich, which tends to exacerbate the regressivity problem across income classes. In fact, smoking is becoming increasingly concentrated in lower classes -variously defined by income, education, occupation, or social class. While the poor were the last to pick up smoking, they are also the last to quit. (See Bobak et al. (2000) .)
21 Although fine-cut tobacco sales account on average for a small percentage of the total tobacco market, in some Member
States, e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands, their share is relatively high. In turn, this means that per-capita consumption figures in Table 1 are lower than they otherwise would be.
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Bootlegging and Smuggling
Furthermore, there are worrisome tobacco tax enforcement problems in the EU. The high levels of tobacco taxation in most Member States, as well as the large differences between them (along with the very large increases in international trade and passenger movements), have become fertile breeding grounds for bootlegging (the purchase of duty-paid tobacco products in excess of crossborder shopping allowances in low-tax states for consumption in high-tax states) and smuggling (the purchase and consumption of tobacco products on which no duty has been paid).
Luxembourg is a prime example of a major bootlegging country due to the much higher total tax rates on tobacco products in neighboring states. If annual consumption per adult in Luxembourg were the same as average consumption in Belgium, France, and Germany (see Table 1 ), then only 10% of cigarettes bought in the duchy would be consumed there. Bootlegging is also a problem between Poland and Germany (the price differential is €2.98; see Table 1 ), Finland and Estonia (€2.85), and Greece and Bulgaria (€1.56) (Joossens and Raw, 2000) . Bootlegging of roll-your-own tobacco is a serious problem for the UK which has a high specific excise of €157.61 per kg compared with Belgium which levies only a moderate ad valorem excise of 37.55%. Only three out of every 10 packets of hand-rolling tobacco consumed in the UK are duty-paid (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2005), in spite of a sizable increase in the cross-border shopping allowance from 1kg to 3kg.
The most serious problem facing EU Member States, however, is not bootlegging but large-scale organized smuggling of tobacco products on which no duty has been paid at all. As Table 1 Committee, 2005) estimated that the share of illicit cigarettes in the domestic market of the UK was some 15%, two-thirds of which was accounted for by smuggling. Many illegal shipments originate in China (the world's largest producer of counterfeit cigarettes), where cigarettes are not controlled regarding carcinogens (arsenic, cadmium, lead) and hazardous remnants of pesticides or excessive levels of tar and nicotine.
Implications for Tobacco Tax Policy
The main conclusion of this review of tobacco taxation in the EU is that the externality argument seems to be less persuasive than appears to be the case at first sight. Also, above-average taxation of tobacco on inverse elasticity grounds is difficult to defend. Furthermore, smuggling, by organized crime, is a serious problem. In short, there are conceptual and empirical limits to excessively high levels of tobacco taxation.
The main issues can be summed up as follows:
• Apparently, the European Commission favors a 'smoking intervention policy' rather than an economic approach that has regard to net social costs and distributional concerns. This view seems defensible if market imperfections, such as information failures, are involved, but smells of paternalism with regard to rational tobacco consumers. The problem of environmental tobacco smoke can best be tackled by a ban on smoking in public places.
• The Commission recommends higher taxes on tobacco, even though the tax burden on cigarettes, at 300% of the pre-tax retail price, is already the highest on any single product in the world. Clearly, the high tax burden promotes smuggling, which in turn undermines health policies and revenue. Although the case for increasing cigarette excises further is weak, an argument can be made for aligning the excise duties on other tobacco products with those on cigarettes.
• The harmonization of tobacco duties, promoted by the Commission, would reduce bootlegging (not smuggling), but violates the subsidiarity principle. Interestingly, harmonization is not pursued in the US (or in other federal countries), where cigarette taxes range from US$0.86 in Virginia to US$2.48 in New Jersey (Cnossen and Smart, 2005 ).
• In a break with the policy pursued thus far, a report published by the Commission now favors specific over ad valorem excise rates as the best means to promote its smoking intervention policy and tax harmonization goals. Specific rates would not require agreement between governments and producers on prescribed retail prices, which violate the free market principle and which are susceptible to manipulation. This would obviate the need for the MPPC concept and the 57% criterion. Interestingly, ad valorem excise duties are not applied in the US or other non-EU industrialized countries. A drawback of specific rates is that their yield does not increase with rises in the consumer price index; accordingly, automatic adjustment should be provided for by law.
In conclusion, the European Commission seems well-advised to pursue specific tobacco taxation and to confine the ad valorem element to the VAT. Rate increases beyond the current level of €64/1000 sticks appear inadvisable if the baby is not to be thrown away with the bath water. Perhaps the new Member States should be granted longer adjustment periods. Further harmonization does
